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NOTE
THE UPROOTING OF THE AMERICAN DREAM:
THE DIMINISHED AND DEFERRED RIGHTS
OF THE U.S. CITIZEN CHILD IN THE
IMMIGRATION CONTEXT
Joanne Joseph*
“The humblest citizen in all the land, when clad in the
armor of a righteous cause, is stronger than all the
hosts of error.” - William Jennings Bryan1
How should the Board of Immigration Appeals respect the rights of
the U.S. citizen children of undocumented immigrants in deportation
proceedings? This Note suggests that the current “extreme hardship
standard” is an inadequate safeguard against the effective deportation of
U.S. citizen children.
Instead, the Board should consider that U.S. citizen children have
constitutionally-rooted rights to family unity, to opportunity, and to remain in the United States. These interests should not be delayed merely
because of the citizen’s age or dependency, or marginalized due to an
undocumented parent’s culpability. Courts should intentionally reposition U.S. citizen children to be at the center of immigration jurisprudence given their unique position, acknowledge the important
fundamental rights at stake, and recognize that children are autonomous
rights-bearing individuals. Under the Mathews v. Eldridge framework,
the citizen children’s interests require more procedural protection in the
removal context than the current “extreme hardship” standard provides.
The current “extreme hardship” standard frames citizen children as
mere bystanders, rather than as citizens with constitutional rights that
are directly at stake in their parents’ removal proceedings. By providing
* B.A., Adelphi University, 2012; Candidate for J.D., Cornell Law School, 2015; Acquisitions Editor, Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy, Volume 24. I would like to thank
Professor Stephen W. Yale-Loehr for inspiring me to engage with the intricacies of immigration law. I am also grateful to my friends and colleagues on the Cornell Journal of Law and
Public Policy for their diligent work and thoughtful insight throughout the editing process.
Finally, I would like to give my deepest gratitude to my parents, Rajoo and Anna Joseph. My
family’s story is an immigrant story, and my parents tirelessly sowed the seeds of sacrifice so
that I might realize every dream, including this one. Thank you.
1 Democratic National Convention Address: A Cross of Gold (July 8, 1896) (transcript
available at http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/williamjenningsbryan1896dnc.htm).
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precisely tailored procedural safeguards during undocumented parents’
removal proceedings, the U.S. can protect citizen children’s constitutional rights without abandoning its significant interest in maintaining a
uniform immigration system.
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INTRODUCTION
On August 23, 2013, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) issued a directive that emphasized the special and vulnerable role
of minor children in the deportation proceedings of their undocumented
parents.2 The directive primarily focused on the rights of noncitizen parents, but it also noted that “[p]articular attention should be paid to immigration enforcement activities involving . . . parents or legal guardians
whose minor children are physically present in the United States and are
[U.S. citizens].”3 ICE released this directive in response to a substantial
rise in the number of undocumented parents who have been deported
from the United States,4 recognizing that citizen children’s interests must
2 See U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, DIRECTIVE 11064.1: FACILITATPARENTAL INTERESTS IN THE COURSE OF CIVIL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES
(2013), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/detention-reform/pdf/parental_interest_direc
tive_signed.pdf.
3 Id. at 1.
4 Falling Through the Cracks: The Impact of Immigration Enforcement on Children
Caught Up in the Child Welfare System, IMMIGRATION POLICY CTR., AM. IMMIGRATION COUN-
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be better protected within the current immigration scheme.5 President
Obama has also noted that deportation should target “violent offenders
and people convicted of crimes; not families, not folks who are just looking to scrape together an income,” because “[w]hen nursing mothers are
torn from their babies, when children come home from school to find
their parents missing . . . the system just isn’t working.”6
Although domestic law has specially protected the interests of children,7 and the Supreme Court has recognized that deportation is a harsh
penalty,8 the rights of children in the immigration context are anomalously dulled. Children of undocumented immigrants are already at a
severe socioeconomic disadvantage compared to other U.S.-born children.9 These hurdles are exacerbated when children’s parents are facing
removal.10 However, under the extreme hardship standard, courts and
the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) generally disregard these setbacks as incidental and expected consequences.11 Under that standard,
CIL (Dec. 12, 2012), http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/falling-through-cracks (“Reflecting a dramatic increase in recent years, statistics released by DHS reveal that 204,810
parents of U.S.-citizen children were removed from the U.S. between July 1, 2010 and September 31, 2012, accounting for nearly 23 percent of all individuals deported during that period. This is likely an underestimate since parents may be reluctant to reveal that they have
children.” (emphasis omitted)).
5 ICE Memo: A Kinder, Gentler Approach to Undocumented Immigrant Parents,
MURTHY LAW FIRM (Sept. 18, 2013), http://www.murthy.com/2013/09/18/ice-memo-a-kindergentler-approach-to-undocumented-immigrant-parents (noting that reasonable people will understand that this policy “makes sensible use of limited resources, and shows respect for family integrity and the needs of children”).
6 Parents Deported, What Happens to US-Born Kids, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 25,
2012), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/parents-deported-what-happens-us-born-kids-0.
7 See, e.g., Bridgette A. Carr, Incorporating a “Best Interests of the Child” Approach to
Immigration Law and Procedure, 12 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 120, 124–27 (2009) (“In
both domestic and international law, a common legal standard for cases involving children is
the ‘best interests of the child’ standard. The [U.S.] immigration system runs counter to this
prevailing norm.”); Erica Stief, Impractical Relief and the Innocent Victims: How United
States Immigration Law Ignores the Rights of Citizen Children, 79 UMKC L. REV. 477, 500
(2010) (“The ‘best interest of the child’ is already the primary consideration in the practice and
formation of laws regarding child abuse, child custody, post-divorce visitation, adoption, and
termination of parental rights. Further, best interest of children is considered in determining
paternity, establishing guardianship, asylum for unaccompanied minors, and intestate claims.”
(footnotes omitted)).
8 Gastelum-Quinones v. Kennedy, 374 U.S. 469, 479 (1963).
9 See Carola Suárez-Orozco et al., Growing Up in the Shadows: The Developmental
Implications of Unauthorized Status, 81 HARV. EDUC. REV. 438, 461 (2011) (noting that children of undocumented immigrants face “uniformly negative” effects and are “at risk of lower
educational performance, economic stagnation, blocked mobility and ambiguous belonging”).
10 Id. at 443 (“[W]ell over one hundred thousand citizen children have experienced their
parents’ deportation in the last decade . . . [a]nd those who have not had this experience
nonetheless live in the daily nightmare of knowing their parents may be swept away at any
time”) (internal citations omitted).
11 See, e.g., Chiaramonte v. INS, 626 F.2d 1093, 1101 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that the
extreme hardship standard is not met “where the deportation would result in nothing more than
the emotional or even financial tribulations which generally follow the separation of the fam-
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the Board may only cursorily consider affected citizen children and does
not recognize that these children are full rights-bearing persons.12 Immigration law’s consideration of children in removal proceedings is not in
alignment with the law’s prioritization of children in other realms, leading to an incoherent national policy.
Attempting to articulate the role and rights of children in immigration proceedings is a natural tug-of-war between governmental objectives
and fundamental individual and social rights. Is the sanctity of the family central in immigration proceedings, or should this consideration be
subject to the United States’ sovereign authority to control its own borders? Should there be discrete classes of personhood and citizenship,
where the children of an undocumented parent cannot exercise the same
level of rights as an adult? What level of process is due to a U.S. citizen
child, and are these additional safeguards feasible? How can the Board
and the courts appropriately protect the rights of U.S. citizen children
without softening national policy, creating perverse incentives, and unraveling immigration policy? These are a few of the difficult questions
that this Note attempts to answer.
This Note analyzes whether U.S. citizen children retain specific
constitutional rights or special protections in the immigration context and
explores how the Board can appropriately prioritize these considerations
without infringing on U.S. sovereignty. Part I examines the plenary
power doctrine and how the current “extreme hardship” standard falls
short of fully considering the rights of the U.S. citizen child. Part II
considers the citizen child as a rights-bearing person under the Constitution and the immigration system’s efforts to indirectly stifle this status.
Part III explores the possible constitutional rights of citizen children in
removal proceedings, including the right to remain in the United States,
the right to family unity, and the right to achieve under the Equal Protection Clause. This Part further applies the Mathews v. Eldridge framework to the citizen child facing constructive deportation and determines
that greater procedural safeguards are required. Part IV concludes and
posits recommendations on how the Board and courts’ decision-making
framework can be altered to better accommodate the citizen child’s vulnerable position and fundamental rights.

ily”); Pilch, 21 I. & N. Dec. 627, 632 (B.I.A. 1996) (holding that the extreme hardship standard contains a “requirement [to show] significant hardships over and above the normal
economic and social disruptions involved in deportation”).
12 David B. Thronson, Kids Will Be Kids? Reconsidering Conceptions of Children’s
Rights Underlying Immigration Law, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 979, 980 (2002) (“Immigration law and
decisions continue to reflect conceptions of children that limit their recognition as persons and
silence their voices.”).
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“EXTREME HARDSHIP” STANDARD

The U.S. Constitution does not directly confer the power to regulate
immigration to Congress.13 Rather than relying on constitutional language, the Supreme Court held that Congress’ plenary power over immigration was rooted in the inherent sovereignty of the United States.14
Congress’ plenary power over immigration law has generally insulated
immigration law from constitutional challenges and normal judicial review.15 Ordinarily, a court will impose strict scrutiny review on any
government action that infringes upon a person’s fundamental rights.16
However, in the immigration realm, courts will only provide minimal
constitutional review because of the “Nation’s need to speak with one
voice in immigration matters.”17 Even so, the standard is surprisingly
low, falling “somewhere between rational basis review and no review at
all.”18 The Supreme Court has justified the low level of review by reasoning that the judiciary is not the appropriate institution to evaluate the
constitutional constraints of Congress’ immigration policies.19
In early formulations of the plenary power doctrine, the Supreme
Court found that Congress’ immigration authority was not restricted by
fundamental constitutional limitations, such as due process. In 1954, the
Court noted, “much could be said for the view, were we writing on a
clean slate, that the Due Process Clause qualifies the scope of political
discretion heretofore recognized as belonging to Congress” in immigration matters, “[b]ut the slate is not clean.”20 The Court also stated, in
13 See Anne E. Pettit, “One Manner of Law”: The Supreme Court, Stare Decisis and the
Immigration Law Plenary Power Doctrine, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 165, 172–73 (1996).
14 Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 603 (1889) (“That the government of
the United States . . . can exclude aliens from its territory is a proposition which we do not
think open to controversy. Jurisdiction over its own authority to that extent is an incident of
every independent nation.”); Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892) (“It is an accepted maxim of international law that every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in
sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its
dominions, or to admit them only in such cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit to
prescribe.”).
15 See, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mendel, 408 U.S. 753, 769–70 (1972).
16 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (“Where certain ‘fundamental rights’ are
involved, the Court has held that regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a
‘compelling state interest,’ and that legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express
only the legitimate interests at stake.” (citations omitted)).
17 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 700 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).
18 Meredith K. Olafson, Note, The Concept of Limited Sovereignty and the Immigration
Law Plenary Power Doctrine, 13 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 433, 441 (1999) (citing Michael Scaperlanda, Justice Thurgood Marshall and the Legacy of Dissent in Federal Alienage Cases, 47
OKLA. L. REV. 55, 57 (1994)).
19 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 700 (“Ordinary principles of judicial review in [the immigration] area recognize primary Executive Branch responsibility. They counsel judges to give
expert agencies decisionmaking leeway in matters that invoke their expertise. They recognize
Executive Branch primacy in foreign policy matters.” (citations omitted)).
20 Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530–31 (1954).
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1892, that “the decisions of . . . administrative officers, acting within
powers expressly conferred by Congress, are due process of law.”21 This
language suggests that Congress’ plenary power should be absolute in
this area, stretching beyond the reach of ordinary constitutional
safeguards.
However, the Court may have moved away from that position when
it recently stated that “[plenary] power is subject to important constitutional limitations.”22 The strength and scope of these limitations remains
unclear, as the Court has adopted deferential judicial review even when
the rights of U.S. citizens were at stake. In Fiallo v. Bell, the Supreme
Court rejected the citizen plaintiffs’ claim that the Court should “scrutinize congressional legislation in the immigration area to protect against
violations of the rights of citizens.”23 The majority’s disregard for U.S.
citizens’ constitutional rights sparked Justice Marshall’s dissenting view
that “discrimination among citizens cannot escape traditional constitutional scrutiny simply because it occurs in the context of immigration
legislation.”24 The Court ultimately held that even when a citizen’s
rights are implicated, congressional immigration policies are “subject
only to limited judicial review.”25 It seemed that in immigration law
matters, the courts would take a “hands-off” approach even if important
rights were at stake.
Fortunately, Congress has not completely disregarded the interests
of affected U.S. citizens in removal proceedings. Under § 244(a)(1) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), one of the factors that an
immigration judge should consider is whether removal will pose “extreme hardship” on a U.S. citizen spouse or child.26 At first glance, this
seems to bolster the rights of the U.S. citizen child. However, the Board
has noted that “extreme hardship” is a vague standard, “not a definable
term of fixed and inflexible content or meaning.”27 The Supreme Court
rejected a broad and relaxed standard because doing so would impermissibly shift discretionary authority from immigration officials to the judiciary.28 The Board now construes extreme hardship so narrowly that
21

Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892).
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 695.
23 430 U.S. 787, 794–95 (1977).
24 Id. at 809 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
25 Id. at 795 n.6. (majority opinion).
26 See 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(e) (2011).
27 Hwang, 10 I. & N. Dec. 448, 451 (B.I.A. 1964).
28 INS v. Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 145–46 (1981) (“The Attorney General . . . [has] the
authority to construe ‘extreme hardship’ narrowly should [he] deem it wise to do so . . . .
[T]he relaxed standard of the [lower court’s] opinion ‘is likely to shift the administration of
hardship deportation cases from the [INS] to [the court of appeals].’”).
22
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most removal cases involving a U.S. citizen child will not be extraordinary enough to warrant relief.29
Under this heightened standard, “the mere existence of a citizen
child, without more, neither validates an otherwise invalid claim of extreme hardship to the alien nor automatically establishes extreme hardship to the child.”30 Immigration judges have no obligation to give
citizen children more than a cursory consideration, given the extremely
deferential judicial review standard. Absent a complete failure to consider a relevant hardship factor, appellate courts can only inquire as to
whether the decision was “arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.”31
Therefore, a child’s particularly vulnerable position and citizenship status will not speak for itself in the immigration context.
According to the Board, a U.S. citizen child’s hardship must be
“substantially different from, or beyond, that which would normally be
expected from the deportation of an alien with close family members
here.”32 The Board has held that a child must face more than the typical
educational and economic setbacks that accompany deportation to show
extreme hardship.33 In addition, although preserving family unity has
been a goal of the U.S. immigration system in its prioritization of familybased immigrant visa categories, the Board has held that the emotional
hardship of severing family and community ties is an ordinary consequence of deportation and does not constitute extreme hardship.34
Since the current “extreme hardship” standard is practically impossible to meet and the U.S. citizen child is only one of many factors that
the judge must consider in a parent’s removal hearing, the child’s interests will often be overlooked. Courts have come up with several reasons
for why a child’s citizenship status should not be dispositive in these
proceedings, and most have centered on the opinion that a child is not a
full and autonomous rights bearer under immigration law.

29 See Edith Z. Friedler, From Extreme Hardship to Extreme Deference: United States
Deportation of Its Own Children, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 491, 513 (1995) (stating that the
hardship standard as it stands now provides “practically unattainable relief for the citizen child
whose parents are subject to deportation.”).
30 Wang v. INS, 622 F.2d 1341, 1348 (9th Cir. 1980), rev’d on other grounds, 450 U.S.
139 (1981).
31 Youssefinia v. INS, 784 F.2d 1254, 1262 (5th Cir. 1986).
32 Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56, 65 (B.I.A. 2001) (emphasis added).
33 See Andazola-Rivas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 319, 323 (B.I.A. 2002) (“[I]t has long been
settled that economic detriment alone is insufficient to support . . . a finding of extreme hardship.” (citing Pilch, 21 I. & N. Dec. 627, 630 (B.I.A. 1996))); L-O-G-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 413,
417 (B.I.A. 1996) (“The fact that economic, educational, and medical facilities and opportunities may be better in the United States does not in itself establish extreme hardship.”).
34 Pilch, 21 I. & N. Dec. 627, 631 (B.I.A. 1996).
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II. THE U.S. CITIZEN CHILD AS AN UNPROTECTED RIGHTS-BEARER
UNDER IMMIGRATION LAW
Under the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, “all
persons born . . . in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States.”35 Some scholars have argued
that birthright citizenship should not extend to the children of undocumented immigrants.36 In United States v. Wong Kim Ark, however, the
Supreme Court held that “[t]he child born of alien parents in the United
States is . . . a citizen.”37 The Court held that to deny birthright citizenship to children of undocumented immigrants “would be to deny citizenship to thousands of persons of . . . European parentage, who have
always been considered and treated as citizens of the United States.”38
Therefore, even if a child’s parents are undocumented immigrants, the
child nonetheless retains citizenship rights and equal protection under the
law.
The Supreme Court has held that the rights of children and adults
are not perfectly equivalent. But it has also reasoned that children are
“persons” protected by the Constitution.39 Children have a unique status
as rights bearers because they may not be able to exercise their rights and
they are under the custody and care of their parents.40 Although parents
usually make decisions on behalf of their children, the Supreme Court
has recognized that children’s rights can be distinct from the interests of
their parents and the government.41 There is no bright-line rule determining when a child has the capacity to exercise his or her rights. “Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only when
one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults,
are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights.”42
Even if children are too young and “lack the capacity necessary for
35

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
See, e.g., VERNON M. BRIGGS, JR., MASS IMMIGRATION AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST:
POLICY DIRECTIONS FOR THE NEW CENTURY 35 (3d ed. 2003) (“[T]here has been no consent
extended by the American polity that children born to parents of illegal immigrants, who
should not be in the country to begin with, ought to be automatically granted U.S. citizenship
with all of the rights, benefits, and entitlements that accrue to that status.”).
37 169 U.S. 649, 691 (1898), (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, OPINIONS OF THE PRINCIPLE
AUTHORS OFFICERS OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS ON EXPATRIATION, NATURALIZATION, AND
ALLEGIANCE 18 (1873).
38 Id. at 694.
39 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (“Students in school
as well as out of school are ‘persons’ under our Constitution” who “possess[ ] . . . fundamental
rights which the State must respect.”).
40 See generally Thronson, supra note 12.
41 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 73–74 (1976) (holding that a
minor has a right to privacy and does not have to obtain parental consent for an abortion
decision).
42 Id.
36

R
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agency, . . . they have needs and interests that the law can define and
protect.”43 Scholars have argued that children’s rights “need not presuppose total autonomy” and that the exercise of rights should not be confused with the existence of rights.44
However, in Acosta v. Gaffney, the Third Circuit emphasized the
latent and almost accidental nature of a birthright citizen child’s constitutional rights in the immigration context. In Acosta, an infant citizen child
had no choice but to leave the United States with her deported undocumented parents, although a district court had reasoned that the constructive deportation of a citizen child was “repugnant to the Constitution”
because “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment creates only one class of citizens.”45 The lower court also stated that “no act of any branch of government may deny to any citizen the full scope of privileges and
immunities inherent in [U.S.] citizenship.”46 The district court further
held that neither Congress’ plenary power over immigration nor the government’s national policies could override a child’s constitutional
rights.47
The Third Circuit reversed.48 The appeals court quoted the Fifth
Circuit that a “minor child who is fortuitously born here due to his parents’ decision to reside in this country, has not exercised a deliberate
decision to make this country his home.”49 The court noted that since the
infant citizen child was only twenty-two months old, she did not have the
capacity to personally exercise her rights.50 The Third Circuit rationalized that there was no constitutional violation because the child’s right to
reside in the United States was not barred by her parent’s removal, but
only delayed until she reached the age of majority.51
Scholars have drawn attention to this general disregard for a birthright citizen’s rights, concluding that the immigration system is more
concerned with punishing an undocumented parent than protecting the
interests of the child.52 In subordinating the rights of the child to the
blameworthiness of the parent facing removal, courts may be indirectly
43 Annette Ruth Appell, Uneasy Tensions Between Children’s Rights and Civil Rights, 5
NEV. L.J. 141, 150 (2004).
44 Thronson, supra note 12, at 988.
45 See Acosta v. Gaffney, 413 F. Supp. 827, 832 (D.N.J. 1976), rev’d, 558 F.2d 1153 (3d
Cir. 1977).
46 Id. (emphasis added).
47 See id. (reasoning that no government policy, however relevant, could justify the “outright destruction” of a child’s central vested citizenship right).
48 Acosta v. Gaffney, 558 F.2d 1153 (3d Cir. 1977).
49 Id. at 1157 (quoting Perdido v. INS, 420 F.2d 1179, 1181 (5th Cir. 1969)).
50 Acosta, 558 F.2d at 1158.
51 Id.
52 See, e.g., Mae M. Ngai, Birthright Citizenship and the Alien Citizen, 75 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2521 (2007).
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and unfairly punishing the innocent citizen children for the acts of a parent. Under this conception, children are “passive objects in relation to
adults, rather than independent persons exercising autonomy.”53
By assuming that the rights of U.S. citizen children are latent and
can only be exercised in the future, the Third Circuit severely undercut a
child’s status as a citizen with guaranteed liberties. Rights theorists have
emphasized that limiting a child’s right due to incapacity is “incoherent,”
“confining,” and a framework under which “powerful elites continue to
define which, if any, of the claims made by children they will recognize.”54 Although the U.S. legal system often characterizes rights in
terms of capacity, it usually specially accommodates children’s interests
instead of citing this limited capacity as an excuse for overlooking them.
Under domestic law, when a child is considered incapable of exercising
his or her rights, the court steps in to determine and protect the best
interests of the child.55 In other areas of U.S. law judges have a responsibility to make child-centered decisions.56 In some cases a court will
appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the child’s interests.57
However, the immigration system relegates U.S. citizen children to
“mere bystanders” in removal proceedings, even though children are directly affected by the removal of a parent.58 There are competing interests that complicate how the children are considered in immigration
proceedings, including the Board’s deference to Congress’ plenary
power and the government’s strong interest in controlling the nation’s
borders. While these are valid counterpoints that should be incorporated
in the Board’s decision-making framework, the Board often absolutely
defers to governmental sovereignty instead of weighing these interests
against those of the affected children.59
Although courts have characterized U.S. citizen children as only incidentally affected by their parents’ deportation, citizen children should
have standing to make direct constitutional claims in the immigration
context. Even when the citizens’ claims are not purely personal, the
53 David B. Thronson, Thinking Small: The Need for Big Changes in Immigration Law’s
Treatment of Children, 14 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 239, 251 (2010).
54 Katherine Hunt Federle, Children, Curfews, and the Constitution, 73 WASH. U. L.Q.
1315, 1316 (1995).
55 See Carr, supra note 7, at 123 (“The failure of immigration law and procedure to
incorporate a ‘best interests of the child’ approach ignores a successful means of protecting
children that is common . . . [in] domestic[ ] [law].”).
56 See Thronson, supra note 53, at 262 (“Outside the realm of immigration law, the
primacy of children’s interests in legal decisions regarding family is ubiquitous”).
57 See Jennifer J. Snider, Guardians Ad Litem: Speaking for the Child, 16 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1253, 1253 (1990) (“A guardian ad litem is in a unique position to provide meaningful factual information to the court [so that the court can] evaluate the best interests of the
child.”).
58 See Friedler, supra note 29 and accompanying text.
59 See generally Thronson, supra note 12.
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Court has recognized that the potential separation of citizens’ family
members by immigration policy is a legally cognizable injury of association.60 In Fiallo v. Bell, the Supreme Court granted standing to citizens
and undocumented fathers who challenged an immigration provision that
excluded their children from entering the United States.61 The plaintiffs
argued that Congress’ policy violated their constitutional rights to equal
protection and familial association.62 Although the Court rejected the
plaintiffs’ claims under deferential judicial review, it recognized that the
fathers had a potential claim to equal protection and familial association
even when they were not being personally excluded.63
In fact, U.S. citizen children’s interests are stronger than those of
the fathers in Fiallo. First, the Court has stated that Congress’ plenary
power is strongest in the context of admission64 and that immigrants who
are physically present in the United States and face removal have more
substantive rights and due process protections than individuals facing exclusion.65 Unlike the plaintiffs’ children in Fiallo, the citizen children’s
parents are being removed, not excluded. U.S. citizen children should
have stronger due process claims in the removal context. Second, the
Fiallo plaintiffs were not facing constructive removal while citizen children face this added hardship because of their dependence on their undocumented parents. In addition to the Fiallo plaintiffs’ equal protection
and familial association claims, the citizen children can also assert their
right to remain.
Even though a child’s injury may be initially derived from the parent’s removal, the child still faces personal harm. In Fiallo, the Court
accorded standing to family members in a far less compelling context.
Therefore, the citizen child’s rights and due process protections should
not be hampered by the fact that he or she is not formally in removal
proceedings. Courts should recognize that a citizen child’s constructive
60 See Adam B. Cox, Citizenship, Standing, and Immigration Law, 92 CAL. L. REV. 373,
391 (2004).
61 430 U.S. 787, 791 (1977); see also Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2011) (granting
standing for citizen fathers who challenged an immigration statute that restricted birthright
citizenship for their illegitimate children).
62 See Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 791.
63 See id. at 798 (“With respect to each of these legislative policy distinctions, it could be
argued that the line should have been drawn at a different point and that the statutory definitions deny preferential status to parents and children who share strong family ties.”).
64 See id. at 792 (“This Court has repeatedly emphasized that over no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over the admission of aliens.”
(quoting Oceanic Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909))).
65 See, e.g., Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 26 (1982) (“[T]he alien who loses his
right to reside in the United States in a deportation hearing has a number of substantive rights
not available to the alien who is denied admission in an exclusion proceeding . . . .”); Maldonado-Sandoval v. INS, 518 F.2d 278, 280 (9th Cir. 1975) (“The differences between proceedings of exclusion and those of deportation are significant.”).
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deportation is not an incidental or indirect consequence. Citizen children,
as “persons,” have standing to make constitutional claims that are complete and separate from those of their undocumented parents.
III. THE CITIZEN CHILD’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
IMMIGRATION CONTEXT

IN THE

Citizen children, as rights-bearing persons under the law, have
many constitutional claims that are affected during parental removal proceedings. These rights include the citizen’s rights to remain in the
United States, to family unity and integrity, and to equal protection under
the law.66 Immigration judges should not pick and choose from these
claims, but instead, should consider the child’s entire bundle of constitutional rights in making removal decisions. Once the Board recognizes
the child as a rights-bearing person under the Constitution, the role of the
citizen child will be recast from a cursory consideration to a fundamental
concern.
A. The Child’s Right to Remain
A citizen has “the constitutional right under the Fourteenth Amendment to remain in the United States.”67 Even though “[b]eing a U.S.
citizen is a defense to removal,”68 citizen children usually have no other
option but to leave the United States and accompany their removed parents. Even if the children remain in the United States with a distant relative or with a foster family, they would be sacrificing the critical care and
attention of their parents. Citizen children face either losing their parents
or losing their home. Claimants have noted that this “Sophie’s choice”
may amount to constructive or de facto removal of citizens in violation
of their constitutional rights.69 The right to remain is a central feature of
U.S. citizenship70 and when a citizen child’s parent is removed the child
must effectively surrender this right.71
66 I adapted this analytical framework from Alison M. Osterberg, Removing the Dead
Hand on the Future: Recognizing Citizen Children’s Rights Against Parental Deportation, 13
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 751 (2009).
67 Coleman v. United States, 454 F. Supp. 2d 757, 766 (N.D. Ill. 2006).
68 LENNI B. BENSON ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY LAW: PROBLEMS AND
STRATEGIES 977 (2013).
69 See, e.g., Jessie M. Mahr, Comment, Protecting Our Vulnerable Citizens: Birthright
Citizenship and the Call for Recognition of Constructive Deportation, 32 S. ILL. U. L.J. 723,
730–31 (2008) .
70 Perdido v. INS, 420 F.2d 1179 (1969); see also Acosta v. Gaffney, 413 F. Supp. 827,
832–33 (D.N.J. 1976) (“What this Court will not do, however, is to use its view of legislative
policy to countenance the outright destruction of the central privilege of an American citizenship already vested: the right to live in the United States for as long as one sees fit.”), rev’d,
558 F.2d 1153 (3d Cir. 1977).
71 Mahr, supra note 69, at 723.
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However, almost every circuit court has held that even if the removal of a parent from the United States leads to de facto deportation,
this does not violate any of the citizen child’s constitutional rights.72 The
Supreme Court has not ruled on this issue. However, if the Court were to
hold that a U.S. citizen child’s constructive deportation is constitutionally acceptable in agreement with the majority of the circuits, this would
be a fatal blow to the citizen child’s rights in the immigration context.
In Perdido v. INS,73 undocumented parents facing deportation made
two claims on appeal: first, deportation would violate their citizen children’s rights; second, it was unconstitutional that young children could
not bestow immediate relative benefits upon their parents. The Fifth Circuit rejected both propositions. The court held that Congress acted rationally in limiting the right to remain to “citizens who had themselves
chosen to make this country their home” and not to “minor children
whose noncitizen parents ma[d]e the real choice of family residence.”74
Even though the court conceded that it is “undisputed that the Perdido
children have every right to remain in this country,” it held that undocumented parents have no such right.75 In addition, children could not impute citizenship benefits to their parents because they were incapable of
choosing to make the United States their home.76 This again hearkens to
the restrictive notion of the child as an accidental and latent rights bearer.
Courts have rationalized that constructive deportation does not absolutely
72 See Payne-Barahona v. Gonzales, 474 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 2007) (“We choose to follow
the path of other courts [in determining whether constructive deportation of a citizen child is
unconstitutional and] . . . [t]he circuits that have addressed the constitutional issue . . . have
uniformly held that a parent’s otherwise valid deportation does not violate a constitutional
right.”); Gallanosa v. United States, 785 F.2d 116, 120 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding “[t]he courts of
appeals that have addressed this issue have uniformly held that deportation of alien parents
does not violate any constitutional rights of the citizen children” and concluding similarly);
Newton v. INS, 736 F.2d 336, 343 (6th Cir. 1984) (holding that the citizen children’s de facto
deportations were constitutionally acceptable because they could return to the United States
once they reached the age of majority); Delgado v. INS, 637 F.2d 762, 764 (10th Cir. 1980)
(“This Court has repeatedly held that the incidental impact [of constructive deportation] visited
upon the children of deportable, illegal aliens does not raise constitutional problems.”);
Mamanee v. INS, 566 F.2d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1977) (“We reject the petitioner’s contention
that her deportation will result in an unconstitutional de facto deportation of her [citizen]
child.”); Acosta v. Gaffney, 558 F.2d 1153, 1158 (3d Cir. 1977) (holding that an infant citizen
child’s constructive deportation did not violate her constitutional rights but only delayed
them); Gonzalez-Cuevas v. INS, 515 F.2d 1222, 1224 (5th Cir. 1975) (reasoning that the deportation of undocumented parents does not violate any constitutional right of citizen children); Mendez v. Major, 340 F.2d 128, 131 (8th Cir. 1965) (holding that the citizen child’s
constitutional rights would not be violated if he were effectively forced to leave the country
with his parent due to a two year residence abroad requirement).
73 420 F.2d 1179 (5th Cir. 1969).
74 Id. at 1181.
75 Id.
76 See id. at 1180.
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bar a citizen child’s right but merely delays it.77 When courts broadly
categorize the child’s right to remain in this way, rather than as a right
against constructive deportation, the immigration system can effectively
“avoid[ ] acknowledging any meaningful rights of citizen children in the
immigration context.”78
The only partial outlier to this view is the Second Circuit, but even
this perspective has changed. In Enciso-Cardozo v. INS,79 the court was
“not prepared . . . to endorse the language [of other circuits, which] indicat[ed] that under no circumstances does due process require that an infant be permitted to participate in the deportation proceedings against his
parent.”80 The court drew attention to “the dependence of an infant upon
his parents and the possibility of substantial effects upon the infant from
his involuntary departure.”81 The court denied intervention to the plaintiff “on the facts of this case,” because it found that the mother was
capable of raising all the appropriate issues to safeguard the child’s interests.82 This reasoning, though more accommodating than other circuits,
still equated the interests of the U.S. citizen child and the undocumented
parent and took for granted that the child’s constitutional rights were
appropriately represented. However, the court left open the possibility
that under the appropriate circumstances, it would recognize the right of
the child to intervene.83 In a later case, a district court stated that “[t]he
Enciso-Cardozo court recognized that the infant mother’s deportation
would force an involuntary departure on the infant, and thus the EncisoCardozo court noted that such prejudice might ordinarily justify intervention.”84 The question of when due process requires that a citizen
child intervene in his or her parent’s removal proceedings seemed
unanswered.
However, in Yuan Liu Chao v. BIA, the Second Circuit changed its
tune and fell in line with the reasoning of the rest of the circuit courts: in
77

See Acosta, 558 F.2d at 1158; Newton, 736 F.2d at 343.
Alison M. Osterberg, Removing the Dead Hand on the Future: Recognizing Citizen
Children’s Rights Against Parental Deportation, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 751, 761 (2009).
79 504 F.2d 1252, 1253 (2d Cir. 1974) (“[T]he petitioners . . . contend that the infant
petitioner, a United States citizen, was denied procedural due process when he was not permitted to intervene in the deportation proceedings brought against his mother. More specifically,
petitioners contend that the infant citizen has a right to be reared in the United States, that the
deportation of his mother necessarily implies his de facto deportation and that, therefore, since
his rights and interests are so vitally affected by the deportation of his mother, he has a constitutional right to intervene in these proceedings, especially the portion of the proceedings dealing with the discretionary grant of voluntary departure.”).
80 Id. at 1254.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 See id.
84 Soto v. United States, No. 89 Cr 230, 1994 WL 110187, at *2 (E.D. Ill. Mar. 28,
1994).
78
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assessing a U.S. citizen child’s claims in his parent’s removal hearing,
the Second Circuit noted that “it is well-settled that an infant’s status as a
citizen and his dependence on his parent do not prevent the deportation
of the alien parent.”85 Furthermore, the court preempted any potential
procedural or substantive fairness concerns by holding that “the agency’s
streamlining regulations do not violate the Due Process Clause.”86 What
was once an open question now seems closed, as any circuit that has
addressed the issue of constructive deportations has affirmatively ruled
against the U.S. citizen child’s claim.
One reason why courts have rejected the de facto deportation theory
is a fear that recognition of this right could “permit a wholesale avoidance of immigration laws” by undocumented parents who have U.S. citizen children.87 Although control over borders and systematic fairness
are legitimate considerations, these policies must be measured against the
full weight of the discriminatory burden placed on the innocent citizen
child.
In Mathews v. Eldridge, the Court crafted a three-part balancing test
to determine the appropriate level of due process required under the Constitution.88 The overarching purpose of due process is to guarantee an
individual’s “opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner.’”89 The Mathews test balances the importance of
the individual’s private right at stake, the risk of an erroneous deprivation
of the right under the current process and value of additional procedural
safeguards, and the government’s interest.90 The Supreme Court has
held that the answer to what level of process is due lies in balancing the
individual’s interest against the interests which the government seeks to
advance by using summary proceedings.91 Additionally, the Supreme
Court has held that the government’s interest in efficiency and saving
costs cannot outweigh an individual’s fundamental constitutional right to
due process, especially when the private interest at stake is substantial.92
85

Chao v. BIA., 395 F. App’x. 725, 728 (2d Cir. 2010).
Id.
87 Coleman v. United States, 454 F. Supp. 2d 757, 768 (N.D. Ill. 2006).
88 See 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
89 Id. at 333 (citing Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
90 See id. at 335.
91 See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262–63 (1970) (“The extent to which procedural
due process must be afforded the recipient is influenced by the extent to which he may be
‘condemned to suffer grievous loss,’ and depends upon whether the recipient’s interest in
avoiding that loss outweighs the governmental interest in summary adjudication.”(citation
omitted)).
92 Id. at 266 (“Thus, the interest of the eligible recipient in uninterrupted receipt of public
assistance, coupled with the State’s interest that his payments not be erroneously terminated,
clearly outweighs the State’s competing concern to prevent any increase in its fiscal and administrative burdens. As the District Court correctly concluded, ‘the stakes are simply too
86
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This test is context-specific, as “due process is flexible and calls for such
procedural protections as the particular situation demands.”93
The Board must not give absolute deferral to Congress’ policies,
especially because “this doctrine of powers inherent in sovereignty is one
both indefinite and dangerous” with no clear limits and the potential to
evolve into despotism.94 This danger is a reason why the Mathews v.
Eldridge test is an appropriate tool to calibrate fairness in this context.
Courts and the Board should be required to give due process to citizen
children and should be able to make balanced, well-rounded determinations. Adopting this framework would preserve focused judicial discretion rather than blind deferral to plenary power.
Further, the Mathews balancing test should apply in the constructive
deportation context, even though the citizen child is not formally in removal proceedings, because the citizen child should have standing to
make personal constitutional claims as someone whose rights are directly
at stake.95 Adopting the Mathews test rightly reorients the citizen child
to be a central feature in the judicial decision-making process.
In this context, the importance of the private right and the government’s interest seem to be opposing considerations. After all, the government’s interest in enforcing a uniform system of immigration and
protecting its borders is strong. Cast broadly, some of the government’s
main concerns include the increased possibility of terrorism and criminal
activity if its control over borders is softened. It should be noted that
these fears are sometimes based on misconceptions. As many scholars
have reported, the rise of undocumented immigrants does not lead to a
rise in criminal activity, especially because these immigrants have more
to lose with the threat of deportation.96 In addition, the September 11th
high for the welfare recipient, and the possibility for honest error or irritable misjudgment too
great . . . .’” (quoting Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893, 904–905 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)).
93 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333.
94 Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 600 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
95 See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976); but see
Encisco-Cardozo v. INS, 504 F.2d 1252, 1253 (2d Cir. 1974) (showing the INS taking a contrary view that “since the immigration judge has jurisdiction to decide only the question of the
deportability of the parent, the [citizen] child has no substantive rights which may be asserted
at the deportation proceeding, and there is, therefore, no need to allow him to intervene.”).
96 See, e.g., From Anecdotes to Evidence: Setting the Record Straight on Immigrants and
Crime, IMMIGRATION POLICY CTR., AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL (July 25, 2013), http://www.
immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/setting_the_record_straight_updated_2.pdf
(“The problem of crime in the United States is not caused or even aggravated by immigrants,
regardless of their legal status. This is hardly surprising since immigrants come to the United
States to pursue economic and educational opportunities not available in their home countries
and to build better lives for themselves and their families. As a result, they have little to gain
and much to lose by breaking the law. Undocumented immigrants in particular have even
more reason to not run afoul of the law given the risk of deportation that their lack of legal
status entails.”).
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terrorist attacks were committed by immigrants who entered the country
legally. This fact underlines the importance of national border security
in preventing terrorism, before falling back on internal enforcement.97
This does not mean that the government’s interest is invalid because the
presence of undocumented immigrants on American soil is still unlawful
and is a matter of national concern.
However, the government’s overarching interest in a uniform immigration system is not what is weighed in the Mathews v. Eldridge analysis, but rather the government’s interest in summary adjudication, as
affected by the additional procedural safeguards.98 In this context, the
government interest factor is narrowed to those government aims that
would be specifically frustrated by a bolstered procedure for citizen children. Here, a reprioritization of an immigration judge’s considerations in
making a removal decision does not amount to a blanket loophole to the
national immigration scheme. A bolstered system may actually better
serve the government’s interests. After all, a judicial process that is more
carefully tailored to protect the rights of U.S. citizens should be the government’s primary interest. These additional procedural safeguards incentivize the government to return to the drawing board and address
immigration concerns with intention, rather than using a heavy-fisted,
over-inclusive standard that eradicates citizen’s rights merely because it
is easier. By instituting more procedural safeguards in removal proceedings, the U.S. government would be enforcing a comprehensive policy of
protecting children’s rights in every realm of law. In characterizing the
government’s interest appropriately, it becomes clear that additional procedural safeguards may more effectively promote national immigration
policy than the current process.
Under the current system, however, courts and the Board of Immigration Affairs defer to government policy and plenary power to the detriment of the citizen child’s interests. The citizen child’s right to not be
constructively deported is essential to his or her citizenship. After all,
“to deport one who so claims to be a citizen obviously deprives him of
liberty” and can “result . . . in the loss . . . of all that makes life worth
97

See, e.g., National Immigration Forum, Top 10 Immigration Myths, IMMIGRAJune 2003, available at http://www.immigrationforum.org/images/uploads/
mythsandfacts.pdf (“No security expert since September 11th, 2001 has said that restrictive
immigration measures would have prevented the terrorist attacks—instead, the[ ] key is good
use of good intelligence. Most of the 9/11 hijackers were here on legal visas.”); Aaron Nicodemus, Hundreds March on City: New Bedford Joins Nation, SOUTH COAST TODAY, Apr. 11,
2006, http://www.southcoasttoday.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20060411/NEWS/
304119994/0/SEARCH (quoting a demonstrator who stated “Eleven million people are not
just going home. Undocumented immigrants are not terrorists. We should focus our attention
on terrorists, not immigrants . . . We need to keep pushing to make sure that something gets
done.”).
98 See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262–63 (1970).

TIONFORUM.ORG,
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living.”99 The citizen child’s interests at stake are “enormous: the right
to live as a citizen in his country of birth with the companionship of his
parents.”100 The possibility that many citizens are losing fundamental
rights should be of utmost concern.101 This interest should not be unfairly diluted by the fact that the child is a minor.
If the court decides to quibble with the idea that government interest
is better served with added safeguards, much of the analysis will depend
on the third factor of Mathews: the risk of erroneous deprivation under
the current process. The fact that the citizen children’s interests are relegated to a single factor under the “extreme hardship” standard when they
are being effectively deported could evidence lack of due process. Under
the current process, citizen children are viewed as mere extensions of
their parent’s interests. They retain no right to intervene or be separately
represented, and their constitutional interests are effectively dismissed.
Judicial discretion in the removal context is so narrow that courts and the
Board are effectively prohibited from fully considering the best interests
of the child, rendering the procedure bereft “because the child is deprived
of basic constitutional protection.”102
Furthermore, there is an inherent and unjust asymmetry in how
rights, benefits, and faults are conferred between parents and children in
the removal context. In Coleman v. United States, the court held that
even though citizens have an “independent right to not be deported,” this
right cannot be imputed to noncitizens, including otherwise unqualified
undocumented parents.103 This one-way flow of citizenship from parent
to child has been analogized to an “earlier set of gendered assumptions”—that men could confer citizenship benefits to their wives, but not
vice versa.104 In fully valuing the child as an important person in the
family unity, “[t]he restriction on children as the source of immigration
99

Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922).
Friedler, supra note 29, at 526; see, e.g., Ng Fung Ho, 259 U.S. at 284 (“Jurisdiction
in the executive to order deportation exists only if the person arrested is an alien. The claim of
citizenship is thus a denial of an essential jurisdictional fact.”); Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253
U.S. 454, 464 (1920) (“It is better that many . . . immigrants should be improperly admitted
than that one natural born citizen of the United States should be permanently excluded from
his country.”).
101 See Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 285 (1966) (“This Court has not closed its eyes to
the drastic deprivations that may follow when a resident of this country is compelled by our
Government to forsake all the bonds formed here and go to a foreign land where he often has
no contemporary identification.”).
102 Friedler, supra note 29, at 526 (“While the procedural due process rights of the illegal
immigrant parent may be satisfied by the suspension of deportation hearing, the citizen child is
not granted the same protection.”).
103 Coleman v. United States, 454 F. Supp. 2d 757, 766 (N.D. Ill. 2006); Ige, 20 I. & N.
Dec. 880, 885 (B.I.A. 1994) (“It has long been held that the birth of a United States citizen
child does not give the child’s parents the right to reside in this country.”).
104 Jacqueline Bhabha, The “Mere Fortuity” of Birth? Are Children Citizens?, 15 DIFFERENCES: A JOURNAL OF FEMINIST CULTURAL STUDIES, no. 2, 2004, at 91, 96.
100
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status is no more natural than the restriction that was imposed upon women.”105 The wife is no longer considered a mere extension of the husband, but rather an autonomous being with a full set of distinct rights that
she is capable of exercising. In the same way, the child should be acknowledged as a separate rights-bearing person in the immigration
context.
This asymmetry goes one step further: not only is it the case that
citizen children cannot impute citizenship benefits to their parents, but
constructive deportation effectively transfers the parents’ culpability to
the innocent citizen child.106 Therefore, the citizen children of undocumented parents retain no advantage in the removal process. On one
hand, their citizenship confers no benefit to their parents. On the other,
they are harshly penalized for their membership in a family unit, an entity the law usually seeks to safeguard.
B. The “Collateral” Right to Family Unity and Companionship
Although “family” is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution,
courts have recognized “a fundamental right . . . [that] protects the integrity of the family unit from unwarranted intrusions by the state.”107 The
centrality and sanctity of the family unit has been deeply interwoven into
the fabric of the nation’s history. In family law, one of the guiding principles is a strong preference to keep the family together as long as the
parents are good caretakers.108 U.S. immigration law also seems to support the family by implementing “family-sponsored immigration, derivative immigration for the family members of certain immigrants, and
waivers of bars of admissibility, as well as cancellation of removal based
on hardship to certain family members.”109
The Supreme Court has noted that the parent-child relationship is
particularly important. “[T]he interest of parents in the care, custody,
and control of their children . . . is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental
liberty interests recognized.”110 The Supreme Court has reasoned that
parents have a constitutionally protected interest in “the companion105

See Thronson, supra note 53, at 256–57.
See David B. Thronson, Entering the Mainstream: Making Children Matter in Immigration Law, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 393, 409–10 (2010).
107 Sims v. State Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 438 F. Supp. 1179, 1190 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
108 See Barbara B. Woodhouse, Children’s Rights: The Destruction and Promise of Family, 1993 BYU L. REV. 497, 511 (1993) (noting that under family law, the ideology of family
unity is not followed only “in those exceptional cases in which parents abdicate their responsibility or abuse their authority.”).
109 See Thronson, supra note 53, at 250–51.
110 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).
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ship . . . of [their] children” that “undeniably warrants deference and,
absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection.”111
The citizen children’s right to family unity is stronger than citizens’
First Amendment right to associate with whomever they choose. In
Kleindienst v. Mandel, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
revoked a professor’s temporary admission because of his ties to the
Communist party.112 The U.S. citizen plaintiffs claimed that they had a
First Amendment right to meet and hear from the professor in person.113
The Court refused to balance these interests because “in almost every
instance of an alien excluded under [the specific immigration provision],
there are probably those who would wish to meet and speak with
him.”114 The Court worried that this would lead to a flood of similar
claims.115
The case of a citizen child facing constructive deportation or family
separation is distinguishable. In the case of a citizen child facing constructive deportation, courts and the Board can limit the discrete group of
people with viable claims to only immediate family members. The
Kleindienst plaintiffs did not have a dependent relationship with the professor that corrupted their personal immigration status. By contrast, U.S.
citizen children regularly face constructive deportation because of the
nature of the parent-child relationship. Moreover, a citizen child’s interest in being with his or her parent is much stronger than a citizen’s interest in exchanging ideas. As the government argued, the Kleindienst
plaintiffs could freely access the professor’s ideas through reading his
books,116 but there is no similar substitute for the personal care and attention of a parent.
It is important to note that the most successful use of family rights is
primarily in domestic law as opposed to immigration proceedings. However, scholars are continuously theorizing about how the tenets of family
law can be incorporated into immigration law to better address the best
interests of the citizen child.117
Courts have generally disregarded the right to family unity in parental removal proceedings unless family separation would be permanent or
the right is accompanied by other claims. In Aguilar v. ICE, the petitioners claimed that because U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
111 Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Services, 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981); see also Stanley v. Illinois,
405 U.S. 645, 651 (1971) (“The integrity of the family unit has found protection in the Due
Process Clause . . . the Equal Protection Clause . . . and the Ninth Amendment.”).
112 See 408 U.S. 753, 759 (1972).
113 See id. at 760.
114 Id. at 768.
115 See id.
116 See id. at 765.
117 See, e.g., Mahr, supra note 69.
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(ICE) did not allow them to make arrangements for their noncitizen children’s care before they were detained, their rights to family unity were
violated.118 The court dismissed the right to family unity as only “tenuous[ly] connected” and “collateral” to the parents’ removal.119 Courts
seem especially hesitant to consider family unity when the undocumented parent is being removed for criminal grounds.120 For example, in
assessing an undocumented felon’s claim of family unity, the First Circuit found there was a logical disparity in this case, since “it [would be]
difficult to see why children would not also have a constitutional right to
object to a parent being sent to prison.”121 In another case, the court
found the right to family unity troublesome in the removal context because of its unwieldy consequences:
[I]f a candidate for cancellation of removal could [prevail], by [simply] stating that he or she would choose to
have the child or children remain in this country while
he or she would go back to another country[,] and that if
such would be deemed to be the requisite degree of hardship[,] as a practical matter[,] the birth of the child
would give the candidate for cancellation an [effective]
right of relief. . . . [F]or better or for worse our Congress
has not seen fit to adopt such a policy in the [INA].122
However, in Recinas, the Board considered family unity and cancelled
removal for the petitioner, a single mother who was the sole provider for
her four citizen children.123 In this case, family unity was one claim
among many that satisfied the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard; other factors included the fact that the mother had no
immediate family in Mexico, faced financial difficulties, and that the
children did not speak Spanish.124 The Board also noted that the respondent’s family “reside[s] lawfully in the United States,”125 much like the
citizen child. In Mojica v. Reno, the court found that the immigration
system had a “duty to respect family” and that “[i]f the deportation of the
family member makes the maintenance of family life practically impossi118

See 510 F.3d 1, 19 (1st Cir. 2007).
Id.
120 See Payne-Barahona v. Gonzales, 474 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2007).
121 Id. at 3.
122 Cabrera-Alvarez v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 1006, 1008–09 (9th Cir. 2005) (reciting statements made by the immigration judge overseeing the proceedings below, which the court
ultimately agreed with).
123 See Recinas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 467 (B.I.A. 2002).
124 See id. at 471–72.
125 Id. at 472.
119
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ble, then the obligation to respect family life will exclude the removal of
the applicant.”126
In contrast to immigration law’s general disregard of the right to
family integrity, a domestic case poses a strong model for how this right
can be reinstated, even when there are strong competing governmental
interests. In Franz v. United States, the D.C. Circuit found a fundamental constitutional right for family unity and held that any government
action that infringed upon this interest required strict scrutiny analysis.127
In that case, the government had legitimate reasons for permanently separating the family as part of the Witness Protection program, including
safety and the administration of justice.128 However, the court found that
that the Constitution grants “reciprocal rights of parent and child to one
another’s ‘companionship,’”129 even in the case of a noncustodial parent.130 The court noted that the nation benefits from a parent’s efforts in
molding “‘socially responsible citizens’” who will “preserve and promote our system of government and our way of life” while also cultivating diversity.131 This language suggests that a nation will receive future
societal value when it prioritizes the sanctity of the family unit and the
importance of the parent-child relationship.
When citizen children’s fundamental right to family unity is combined with their fundamental right to remain in the country, the balance
of the Mathews factors changes and the importance of the private right
weighs more heavily in comparison to the government’s interest. It is
imperative that the Board does not consider the right to family unity in
isolation, but rather in conjunction with citizen children’s other rights.
C. The “Tainted” Right to Achieve Under the Equal Protection
Clause
By restricting consideration of a citizen child’s rights to a severely
heightened standard, the immigration system could violate the citizen
child’s rights under the Equal Protection Clause. When the Board disregards the usual educational, economic, and medical setbacks that children face when they are constructively removed with their parents, it
may be relegating these children to a second class of citizenship.132
In his Plyler v. Doe concurrence, Justice Blackmun emphasized that
by refusing to allow the noncitizen children of undocumented parents to
126

970 F. Supp. 130, 150 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
See 707 F.2d 582, 603 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
128 See id.
129 Id. at 595.
130 Id. at 588, 594.
131 Id. at 598 (quoting Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638 (1979) (plurality opinion)).
132 See Bill Piatt, Born as Second Class Citizens in the U.S.A.: Children of Undocumented
Parents, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 35, 50–51 (1988).
127
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attend public schools, the government threatened to create a “discrete
underclass” of children in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.133
This singling out was especially heinous because children who were denied an education were placed at an “insurmountable competitive disadvantage, for an uneducated child is denied even the opportunity to
achieve.”134 As a result, the child is silenced in the political process,
pushed to the margins of society, and this “subclass could be easily exploited and deprived of any basic rights for fear of stepping out of the
shadows to assert such rights.”135 Although the Court assessed the case
under an intermediate scrutiny standard, the majority found that even
under a rational basis standard, noncitizen children should not be punished for the actions of their parents.136
Plyler v. Doe is not a perfect analogy to the plight of a citizen child
facing constructive deportation because it was not an immigration case
subject to the plenary power doctrine. Plyler, however, does demonstrate some illuminating parallels. Children cannot be denied equal treatment under the law on the basis of their race, alienage, gender, or
parentage.137 A citizen child of undocumented parents belongs to a class
of other innocent citizen children who are effectively discriminated
against by having their parents removed. After all, the citizen children
could be constructively removed with their family to a country that provides much more limited educational and economic opportunities.
While the impediment to the child’s right to achieve might not be as
clear as the complete deprivation of education in Plyler, the uprooting of
the child’s entire lifestyle, language, and community could severely hamper his or her opportunities in the future.138 Since the Supreme Court
held that innocent noncitizen children should not be penalized for what
their parents did wrong,139 this interest should be even stronger in pro133

457 U.S. 202, 234 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Id.
135 Osterberg, supra note 78, at 785.
136 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 220 (“[Section] 21.031 is directed against children, and imposes its
discriminatory burden on the basis of a legal characteristic over which children can have little
control. It is thus difficult to conceive of a rational justification for penalizing these children
for their presence within the United States. Yet that appears to be precisely the effect of
§ 21.031.”) This holding is especially helpful in considering how the case would have come
out if were a federal, not a state, law. Although state classifications based on alienage merit
intermediate or strict scrutiny analysis, federal classifications of alienage are granted more
deference and only merit rational basis analysis. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 83 (1976).
Therefore, even if Plyler involved a federal classification of children based on their alienage
status, the government act would not have withstood rational basis analysis.
137 See Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 756 (2011).
138 See Mahr, supra note 69, at 739–42 (analyzing benefits of the U.S. education system
and the healthcare system, and concluding that there is generally a clear advantage for a child
who remains in the United States).
139 See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 220.
134
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tecting the rights of the citizen child. By characterizing the citizen children’s right to remain as “delayed,” the Acosta court unfairly
discriminated against the children of undocumented parents. By delaying the rights of citizen children of undocumented immigrants, the immigration system essentially creates classes of citizens.140
The Board has an even stronger interest to consider this constitutional right as one that supersedes any plenary power, because while
equal protection is an explicitly entrenched right in the Constitution,
Congress’ plenary power over immigration is only inferred. As Justice
Douglas said in his Harisiades v. Shaughnessy dissent, “[t]he power of
deportation is therefore an implied one. The right to life and liberty is an
express one. Why this implied power should be given priority over [express guarantees] has never been satisfactorily answered.”141
Rather than dismissing the usual hardships that come with removal,
immigration judges must balance the Mathews v. Eldridge factors with
the knowledge that the children are innocent citizens who may be denied
a better future due to circumstances outside their control. However, if
the parent is being deported to a well-developed country with similar
opportunities to the United States, the court may reduce the weight of the
importance of the private right in its analysis. This would not completely
diminish citizen children’s rights, as they would still retain the constitutional right to remain and the right to family unity.
Citizen children of undocumented immigrants must not be discriminated against in the immigration system because of their parents’ culpable acts. This is a matter of fundamental fairness. “[V]isiting . . .
condemnation on the head of an infant is illogical and unjust. . . . [It] is
contrary to the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear
some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing.”142 This
kind of discrimination is a transparently “ineffectual” and “unjust[ ] way
of deterring the parent.”143 One judge articulated a policy rationale behind the extreme hardship standard by hypothesizing that “any foreign
visitor who has fertility, money, and the ability to stay out of trouble with
the police for seven years [could] change his status . . . to a permanent
resident status without the inconvenience of immigration quotas.”144
140

See Mahr, supra note 69, at 736.
342 U.S. 580, 599 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
142 Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972).
143 Id. at 175; see also Intermountain Health Care, Inc. v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Blaine
Cnty., 707 P.2d 1051, 1055 n.2 (Idaho 1985) (characterizing as “somewhat shocking” the
county’s assertion that the child’s citizenship was irrelevant and that the child and her parents
were “legally indistinguishable” in a case in which citizen children of undocumented parents
were denied healthcare).
144 INS v. Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 145 (1981) (quoting Wang v. INS, 622 F.2d 1341, 1352
(9th Cir. 1980) (Goodwin, J., dissenting)).
141
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While the aims of avoiding loopholes in immigration law and deterring
unlawful conduct are valid ones, Congress has alternative ways to resolve these problems without infringing upon citizens’ fundamental
rights.145 Under the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test, courts and the
Board would no longer be able to make blanket plenary power justifications but would have to consider the U.S. citizen children’s important
competing individual interests.
The Plyler Court noted that even though undocumented status could
be related to a proper legislative action and was the product of conscious
and unlawful action, it would be unfair to discriminatorily burden children “on the basis of a legal characteristic over which children can have
little control,” such as parental alienage.146 Stripping constructive deportation to its core, the immigration system is essentially imputing the sins
of the parent to the innocent citizen child.
Digging deeper into the immigration system’s rhetoric, when the
Board rationalizes that the children’s citizenship rights are only indirectly affected, it disregards the inherently dependent relationship of children to their parents and the recognized undesirability of children
remaining in the United States without their families. The deportation of
a parent will almost always mean the deportation of a U.S. citizen child.
When a court states that the right to remain is not vested in the children
of noncitizens until many years later, it demarcates an underclass of especially vulnerable citizens. The immigration system, therefore, pays lip
service to the rights of birthright citizen children without actually protecting those rights.
Here, the citizen children are completely innocent and have no control over their parents’ decision to remain in the United States illegally,
and yet are effectively deprived of their citizenship right. Although the
Board may note that this deprivation is only temporary, in practice, it
will not be easy for the citizen child to make the transition from learning,
growing, and living in a different country to returning to the United
States after painfully severing all ties. This setback is exacerbated when
courts or the Board remove children from the United States at a young
age. A citizen’s right to return and reside in the United States may be
effectively barred by educational, socioeconomic, and language
disparities.147
145 See Acosta v. Gaffney, 413 F. Supp. 827, 833 (D.N.J. 1976), rev’d, 558 F.2d 1153 (3d
Cir. 1977) (holding that even if prioritizing the citizen child’s interests in recognizing her
constructive deportation is unfair to those undocumented immigrants who are lawfully waiting
in line, Congress has “ample authority to ameliorate the hardship by relaxing the quota provisions” or amending enforcement tactics).
146 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220 (1982).
147 Noreen M. Sugrue, American-Born Children Shouldn’t Be Deported, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, July 17, 2006, at 9.
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This careful sidestepping of the citizen child’s constitutional rights
is fundamentally the wrong way to appropriately consider the child, the
family, and the nation in the context of removal proceedings. The Board
should not blindly coast on Congress’ policies in the face of blatant injustice, but should instead reclaim a more focused and principled scope
of judicial discretion.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

AND

CONCLUSIONS

Once the Board reshapes its decision-making process to prioritize
the reality of citizen children as active rights-bearing “persons,” immigration judges will be equipped to better assess the stakes and to partake
in more balanced policy evaluations. The framework must be flexible to
retain a high enough standard to avert loopholes in immigration law and
remain consistent with national immigration policy. The key to an effective reform will be multifaceted, and should be targeted not only at courtroom procedure, but also should address overall national policies and
goals. The shift to child-centered consideration should be pursued across
all branches of government and all realms of law. Only then will the
overall scheme achieve coherence.
Merely shifting the standard from “extreme hardship” to “best interests of the child,” as many scholars recommend,148 will not make much
of a quantitative difference unless a more guided framework is implemented. In Cabrera-Alevarez v. Gonzales, the Ninth Circuit considered
the petitioner’s proposed “best interests” standard fashioned after the
U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child.149 The court concluded that
the Convention “requires only that the child’s interests be ‘a primary
consideration,’ without specifying the precise weight to be given to that
consideration relative to others” and that “the child’s interests are already a primary consideration in the agency’s [removal] decision[s].”150
The court’s reasoning demonstrates that well-intentioned standards, if
left open to interpretation, will only lead to the same results.
The Mathews balancing test provides the best guide for expanding
and focusing judicial discretion to properly prioritize the interests of the
child. Under this standard, the child’s constitutional bundle of rights
must be properly weighed against the government’s interest in preserving
uniform immigration policy. Due process requires effective safeguards
of important rights in the removal process, including the rights of U.S.
citizen children.
148

See, e.g., Carr, supra note 7 and accompanying text.
See 423 F.3d 1006, 1007 (9th Cir. 2005); Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov.
20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b38f0.html.
150 Cabrera-Alevarez, 423 F.3d at 1011.
149
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The most fundamental premise in using this balancing test is the
judicial recognition that U.S. citizen children’s constructive deportation
is a constitutional violation. In order to accept this theory and bolster
current due process, the Board and courts must accept that the children’s
birthright citizenship rights are not accidental, fortuitous, or conveniently
delayed. Instead, judges must recognize that these rights warrant special
consideration. Once this understanding is accepted, it becomes clear that
the current immigration process does not provide sufficient protections
for U.S. citizen children’s rights.
A. Granting U.S. Citizen Children a Right to Testify
First, immigration judges must have the duty to create a more comprehensive record in every case involving U.S. citizen children. If U.S.
citizen children can speak on their own behalf, the Board should permit
them to take the stand. The Board or courts should not mechanically
assume that the parents would effectively raise every available defense
on their citizen children’s behalf. Instead, the children should exercise a
separate right to testify and be heard. The citizen children must never be
considered a mere extension of their undocumented parents’ status and
interest. By giving the citizen children a literal voice in the proceedings,
the judge will have a more complete set of evidence and be better
equipped to make a child-centered evaluation. In this way, the judge has
broader discretion to discern and weigh the most important competing
concerns. By expanding the narrow “extreme hardship” standard to a
more precisely calibrated balancing test that focuses the scope of judicial
discretion, due process in removal proceedings will be significantly improved. However, this change alone is not enough, as in many cases, the
children cannot adequately represent themselves.
B. Giving U.S. Citizen Children Separate Representation
Another way to ensure that U.S. citizen children are not treated as
mere bystanders is for the courts to recognize a separate right for a
guardian ad litem in the case of a constructive deportation. After all,
“[t]he right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did
not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel.”151 Generally, if the
court determines that representation might be inadequate or that a person’s interests are not represented, it may appoint a guardian ad litem to
“receive notice, give consent, and otherwise represent, bind, and act on
behalf of a minor . . . or protected person.”152 This is a particularly
important safeguard in cases where the citizen children may not be able
151
152

Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68–69 (1932).
See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-305 (West 2014).
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to speak for themselves. Without a representative, the children’s plight
is diluted into merely one of many factors the immigration judge should
consider, with no special emphasis placed on the citizen child’s interests.
Under Mathews’ risk of erroneous deprivation factor, any additional
procedural safeguards should be valuable in preventing the risk of erroneously depriving the right at stake. The current scheme relegates the
U.S. citizen children’s best interests to a cursory consideration rather
than a central evaluation. Additional accommodation is especially required in a parent’s removal hearing because of possible language difficulties, the need for relevant information-gathering, the vulnerability of
the child, the stress and novelty of preparing for a hearing, and the distinctness of the citizen children’s rights from those of the parents. The
use of guardians ad litem is an effective way to “figuratively increase the
volume of a child’s voice in the court and the legal process.”153
Given the uniquely vulnerable position of U.S. citizen children, the
importance of their constitutional rights, and the near impossibility of the
“extreme hardship” standard, the specific situation of a constructive deportation should garner the right to separate legal counsel. Guardians ad
litem investigate, monitor, and champion the best interests of the child
“as the balance shifts from parental decision making to judicial decision
making when the state intervenes.”154 These court appointees would effectively represent U.S. citizen children without compromising the doctrine of judicial neutrality. By granting the children a separate advocate,
the Board and the courts will be formally recognizing the children as
directly and uniquely affected parties to the proceedings with a distinct
set of valued rights.
Critics may point to the possible costs involved with granting U.S.
citizen children the right to counsel, as “[t]he appearance of counsel for
the citizen is likely to lead the government to provide one” and may turn
the hearing into a “protracted controversy.”155 In this case, however,
protecting the constitutional rights at stake and correcting the current
lack of due process should be considered more important than the government’s interest in frugality. Just as a child has the right to a guardian
ad litem in family court, this right becomes even more pronounced in the
immigration setting because of what is at risk. In addition, there is a
limiting principle: a guardian ad litem will not be made available in
every immigration case, but only those that involve a U.S. citizen child
facing constructive deportation.
153 Tara Lea Muhlhauser, From “Best” to “Better”: The Interests of Children and the
Role of a Guardian Ad Litem, 66 N.D. L. REV. 633, 633 (1990).
154 Id. at 642.
155 Henry J. Friendly, “Some Kind of Hearing”, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1288 (1975).
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C. Prioritizing Criminal Deportations Above Potential Family
Separations
On a broader national policy note, President Obama proposed a rational scheme in June 2012 by ordering the removal of undocumented
criminals before pursuing actions that would separate families and infringe upon the rights of U.S. citizen children.156 The safety and collective well-being of the American people is a stronger interest than mass
deportations, and should be prioritized this way. It is in the nation’s best
interests to focus scrutiny on dangerous undocumented immigrants rather
than on what may be the easiest target, the family. In this way, the immigration system and overall national policy will rightly align in placing
the family unit and children as interests of utmost concern and consideration. This child-centered approach should not upset national immigration
policy, but rather create coherence with government aims.
In addition, the solution should not rest completely in the hands of
the Board and the courts, but can also be creatively solved by other
branches of government. After all, Congress has the resources to approach immigration reform in less restrictive ways than mass deportations of U.S. citizen children. What may be easiest in the administrative
sense may not be what is most beneficial for the nation in the long term.
D. Allowing a Limited Transfer of Benefits from Child to Parent
Another possible change would be to allow the transfer of status
benefits to parents who have a sincere relationship with their child. This
approach fully recognizes the U.S. citizen children as distinct and autonomous carriers of rights in a way that advantages, and does not hinder
their family unit. This benefit would not confer full citizenship, but
would allow the undocumented parent to remain in the United States
with work authorization until the child reaches the age of majority. A
parent could demonstrate a sincere relationship by a totality of circumstances, including evidence of continued presence, financial support, and
significant communication. This will not be a difficult term to apply, as
it already has meaning in immigration law in another context: “After a
citizen or legal permanent resident has filed, on behalf of an alien relative, a visa petition . . . the Government will approve the petition after
156 See Parents Deported, What Happens to US-Born Kids, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 25,
2012), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/parents-deported-what-happens-us-born-kids-0 (“‘When
nursing mothers are torn from their babies, when children come home from school to find their
parents missing . . . when all this is happening, the system just isn’t working and we need to
change it,’ Obama declared during his first run for president in 2008. [H]e [later] told a Texas
audience that deportation should target ‘violent offenders and people convicted of crimes; not
families, not folks who are just looking to scrape together an income.’”).
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verifying that the claimed familial relationship is bona fide.”157 Under
this approach, citizen children can be under the financial, physical, and
emotional care of their parents during their most tender and impressionable years without the threat of separation. In addition, this solution upholds the government’s interest and avoids creating permanent loopholes
in the immigration system.
The scheme could be structured similarly to how the Department of
Homeland Security’s Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program
allows young undocumented immigrants to remain in the United States
under the color of law without granting a direct path to full citizenship.158 Once the child has reached the age of majority and parental care
is not as vital, parents may then be removable under Congress’ broader
discretion. If Congress decides to remove the parents at that point, the
parents should not be able to take advantage of the system and reapply
for lawful visa status once the child reaches the age of twenty-one. This
way, the parents will be effectively punished for their actions in illegally
entering the country without unfairly punishing their innocent U.S. citizen children. This bright-line “cut off” point establishes a limiting principle, removes the constant threat of deportation from families, avoids
creating perverse incentives, and ensures that undocumented immigrants
will not be permanently rewarded for their efforts.
Congress can also be creative in incentivizing citizenship by carving
out exceptions for parents who, for example, make significant economic,
intellectual, artistic, or humanitarian investments in their community.
This approach acknowledges that immigrants can be important investors
into our communities and highlights the fundamental role of parents’
care and attention in raising and molding excellent future citizens. In
this way, both the family and the nation benefit. This refocused perspective recognizes the child as a rights bearer, preserves a long-term model
for good citizenship, achieves national aims, creates space for real judicial discretion, and attempts to strike a balance between competing policies in a lasting and meaningful way.
These modifications should not unmoor immigration law, but rather
precisely tailor the Board’s discretion in a principled way. The Board
and courts should not be backed into considering U.S. citizen children’s
rights under a nearly impossible standard without meaningful discretion
and appropriate procedural safeguards. Courts must acknowledge that
the current immigration scheme falls short of constitutional due process
157 Bolvito v. Mukasey, 527 F.3d 428, 430 (5th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
158 For further explanation of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program, see
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (July 2, 2013), http://
www.dhs.gov/deferred-action-childhood-arrivals.

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\24-1\CJP106.txt

2014]

THE UPROOTING

unknown

OF THE

Seq: 31

AMERICAN DREAM

9-OCT-14

13:14

239

and fundamental fairness. However, possible solutions are available and
not so difficult to put into practice. The largest obstacle to a coherent
immigration framework comes down to the Board and courts’ conception
of the nature of rights.
The Board and courts must understand that U.S. citizen children are
rights bearers who should be protected in the removal context. These
entities must further recognize that currently accepted de facto deportations are a fundamental breach of the children’s constitutional rights to
remain in the United States, to family unity, and to achieve under the
Equal Protection Clause. By repositioning the child as a central consideration in judicial determinations and national policy, immigration law
will reflect the common sense family-centric values that are apparent in
every other realm of U.S. law. Immigration law should not be wrought
with the back and forth of opposing policies. Instead, it should be an
attempt to weave all of the fundamental values and facets of American
society and wellbeing into a coherent, well-balanced system. By considering some of these alternatives, maintaining awareness of all of the
rights and interests at stake, and thinking creatively, both the government’s interests and the citizen children’s constitutional rights can be
appropriately weighed within the framework of due process.
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